

UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN



THE TWO HUNDRED AND NINETY-FIRST (291ST) INAUGURAL LECTURE

“THE WORSHIP OF AN UNKNOWN DEITY”

By

PROFESSOR EMMANUEL OLUGBADE OJO

B.Sc. (Hons) Pol. Sc. (Ibadan), M.Sc., Pol. Sc.,

Ph.D. (Comparative Politics), Ibadan

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,

UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN, NIGERIA

THURSDAY, 16TH OCTOBER, 2025

**This 291st Inaugural Lecture was delivered under the
Chairmanship of:**

The Vice-Chancellor

Professor Wahab Olasupo Egbewole, SAN
LL.B (Hons) (Ife); B.L (Lagos); LL.M (Ife); Ph.D. (Ilorin);
FCArb; Fspsp

16th October, 2025

ISBN: 978-978-699-468-0

Published by:

**The Library and Publications Committee,
University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria**

Printed by

UNILORIN Press, Ilorin, Nigeria



PROFESSOR EMMANUEL OLUGBADE OJO

**B.Sc. (Hons) Pol. Sc. (Ibadan), M.Sc., Pol. Sc.,
Ph.D. (Comparative Politics), Ibadan**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES,
UNIVERSITY OF ILORIN, NIGERIA**

BLANK

Courtesies

The Vice-Chancellor,
The Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic),
The Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Management Services),
The Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research, Technology and Innovation),
The Registrar,
The Bursar,
The University Librarian,
The Provost, College of Health Sciences,
Deans of Faculties, most especially, the Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences,
Dean of Postgraduate School and Students' Affairs,
Professors and other members of Senate,
Director of Units,
Heads of Departments, most especially
Head, Department of Political Science,
Other members of the Academic Staff,
Other members of the Administrative and Technical Staff,
My Lords, Spiritual and Temporal,
Distinguished Invited Guests,
Distinguished Students of the Department of Political Science,
Gentlemen of the Press,
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen.

Preamble

Mr Vice-Chancellor, let me begin this Inaugural Lecture with a funny story of how I became an '*accidental*' Political Scientist. As an apprentice typist, I had nurtured the idea of becoming a Barrister at Law. Reason was that, as a public letter writer, as we were called then, one of our duties was preparing different kinds of legal documents, such as Purchase Agreement, Conveyance and several other legal agreements. This, no doubt, spurred me into wanting to read Law. However, as fate would have it, one day, as I was filling the Joint Admissions and Matriculation Board (JAMB) form (Direct Entry), my father (of blessed memory) was passing by and asked what I was doing. I

told him I was filling my JAMB form. He then inquired what course I was preparing for. In pronto, I told him LAW. Very funny, he asked whether I was preparing for hell fire after this temporal existence. My father, being a deeply religious person, was of the opinion that lawyers might not meet heaven. I tried to convince him that I just wanted to practice law for a while, and then move to the Bench from the Bar.

He considered that as a double jeopardy by mentioning some judges whose hands were known to be tied while delivering celebrated political judgments. After a long argument, I agreed with my dad and, without bathing a breath, changed the course choice from Law to Political Science, to avoid hell fire, according to my dad! Vice-Chancellor, Sir, that was how I became a student of Political Science and pressed on until I attained the zenith of my career, even though such an argument from my late unlettered father could not dissuade my youngest son from reading Law. Thus, there are Political Scientists who came about or rather into Political Science by accident and I am one of them! But, in all of these, to God indeed be the glory.

Introduction

With that preamble, Mr. Vice-Chancellor, the title of my lecture is, **The Worship of an Unknown Deity**. Let me add that ever since I dabbled into Political Science, my works have been in Comparative Politics generally and area study specifically. The geographical area is my country Nigeria, this was borne out of patriotic zeal, not only to understand our polity, but also to proffer solutions to the myriad of political problems steering us in the face. Doing this, I focussed on Federal Studies, Political Communication, Civil-Military Relations (CMR), Democracy, Democratisation and lately, Legislative Studies. Meanwhile, my first love has always been federalism, to which I devoted my doctoral thesis, with a conclusion that much as we have adopted federalism, with its classical foundation laid as far back as 1954 by Lyttleton Constitution, Nigeria keeps on groping in the dark by worshipping an unknown deity.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, the case of Nigeria with federalism as we shall see later in this lecture is indeed similar to the Biblical story of the Athenians. According to Apostle Paul in Acts of the Apostles Chapter 17:16-25, if there were ever a place where the true God was unknown, it was in ancient Athens. The people were deeply religious, but were wholly given to idolatry. Saying the city was full of idols was putting the matter mildly. The Parthenon was dedicated to all the 30,000 public statues. A statue of Hermes was in front of every house in one street. Every house in the city had its household **god** in the inner shelf. Seventeen temples were visible from Mar's Hill where the Apostle Paul was standing when he spoke to the people of Athens.

No doubt, Athenians were too superstitious. Apostle Paul said he was passing by and saw a lot of them devoted to many '**gods**'. And one of their temples specifically devoted to The Unknown God, which they worshipped ignorantly. What a striking similarity with Nigerians ever since 1954 when federalism was adopted because of the size and ethnic conglomerate of Nigeria. However, Nigeria has found it extremely difficult to imbibe the tenets and basic canons of federal principles and practices as we shall see later in this lecture, proving that Nigerians lack the federal spirit to accommodate each other and one another for national integration and national development.

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, it is instructive to note that inaugural lectures are far in-between from Political Science Department. The first we ever had was delivered by Professor Adeoye A. Akinsanya (of blessed memory), entitled "*Transnational Corporations and Economic Nationalism in the Third World*". This was on 6th December, 1984. It was some three decades later that Professor Mojeed O. A. Alabi delivered another one entitled: '*Politics and Law: Anatomy of the Siemens Twins*' on 13th November, 2014. It is assumed that this one may however open a floodgate of inaugural lectures from the Political Science Department, all other things being equal.

The Plural Character of Nigeria

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, it is imperative to note *ab initio* the plural character of Nigeria for us to be able to appreciate the enormity of the problem we are confronted with in terms of the challenge of national integration. Nigeria, like several other new states and segmented societies, must contend with the problem of integrating her numerous and diverse ethnic groups that constitute the federation (**Ojo**, 2002). Nigeria has well over 400 ethnic groups (**Ojo**, 2009). To Suberu (1998), Nigeria is one of the most ethnically-diverse countries in all regions and climes of the world, and some of the ethnic groups are bigger than many states of contemporary Africa. At the beginning of the 1960s, there were over 3,000 ethnic groups in the whole world; about 1,000 were represented in the continent of Africa, and 445 of these in Nigeria alone (**Ojo**, 2009).

In that wise, Nigeria has a relatively unique problem of achieving solidarity in action and purpose in the midst of hundreds of ethnic nationalities where justice reigns (**Ojo**, 2005). This uniqueness creates unique problems unknown to the experience of other peoples in the world ... no Western or Eastern civilisation has ever evolved a political system that can cope with this gigantic problem of hyper-ethnic instability syndrome (Onwujeogwu, 1995). It's been pointed out that among federal democracies; India matches Nigeria in its degree of cultural complexity (Roy, 2002). Like the Indian federal state, which has been described as the land of a "million mutinies" (Roy, 2002). Nigeria is no doubt a deeply divided and plural society.

It is not amazing, therefore, that these ethnic groups are always in conflict and competition over resources. This is not unexpected, especially between ethnically-defined constituencies (Williams, 1980). The reason is that almost by definition, ethnic groups compete for the strategic scarce resources of their respective societies. This occurs because ethnic groups are socio-political entities which, while inhabiting the state, country or economic area, consider themselves biologically, culturally,

linguistically or socially distinct from each other and most often, view their relations in actual or potentially antagonistic terms. The nature of ethnic groupings in each society and the competitive short term tactics and long term strategies they employ are functions of history and of the resources they seek to control (Ojo, 2009). The plural and deeply divided character of Nigerian state makes federalism a viable option.

Conceptualisation of Federalism

The primary requirement for debating anything is to understand first and foremost the actual thing being talked about (Ojo, 2006). Though the concepts used in this lecture are quite well-known, widely used and, to a large extent, self-explanatory, it may nevertheless be useful to provide the working definitions of the principal concepts in order to minimize the possibility of misinterpretation. The primary reason for this is not unconnected with the fact that concepts may have both cultural and ideological contextualisation, more so that concepts like power, justice, peace and equality, federalism and national integration with development fall into this category of essentially contested concepts that Gallie (1962) (a philosopher) regarded as contested.

Weldon (1953) also subscribes to this, saying that such concepts necessarily generate unsolvable debates about their meaning and application because as Little points out, they contain ideological elements which render empirical evidence irrelevant as a means of resolving the dispute (Little, 1987). We now proceed to properly conceptualise federalism for the purpose of this lecture.

Federalism is a constitutional mechanism for dividing power among different levels of government so that federated units can enjoy substantial and constitutionally-guaranteed autonomy over certain policy areas, while sharing power in accordance with agreed rules over their areas. Thus, federalism combines partial self-government with partial shared-government (Bulmer, 2011). Federal systems are usually

associated with culturally-diverse or territorially-large countries. Notable examples of federal countries (or countries with federal-like characteristics, sometimes referred to as ‘quasi-federations’ include: Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Spain, South Africa and the United States of America (Bulmer 2011). He went further to clarify that federalism is a system of government that establishes a constitutionally-specified division of powers among different levels of government. There are usually two main levels: (a) a national, central or federal level; and (b) a state, provincial or regional level. In some cases, however, a federal system may prescribe a three-fold distribution of power by recognising the constitutional powers of local government (South Africa) or by creating complex forms of overlapping territorial and linguistic federalism (Belgium).

The term ‘federal’ is derived from the Latin word ‘*foedus*’, which means ‘covenant’. This embodies ideas of promise, commitment and understanding so that the federal idea involves cooperation, reciprocity and mutuality (Chen, 1999; Atkinson, 2004). In essence, a federal arrangement is one of partnership established and regulated by a covenant whose internal relationships reflect the special kind of power sharing which must prevail among the partners, namely: one that both recognizes the integrity of each partner and seeks to foster a special kind of unity among them (Elazar, 1994). In this sense, the federal idea is concerned with developing a consensus and workable combination of self-rule and shared rule.

A doyen of federalism Wheare (1963), in his famous book, *Federal Government*, conceptualizes federalism or federal government as ...the method of dividing power so that general and regional governments are each within a sphere co-ordinate and independent. It is, therefore, not surprising that students of political constitutionalism and federalism in particular have viewed this definition as being very rigid, while commentators too have been displeased with the rigidity of Wheare’s definition which, when strictly applied, is likely to exclude all known

federations. It should also be stated that his definition is indeed legalistic and inflexible. The reason for this is not far-fetched. Wheare used United States of America as a paradigm of federal government, thus making his model to be *static* and *Eurocentric*.

It may be the case that the definition of federalism must include the United States but it is simply not true that any federal system which is unlike America's political life is condemned as not being federal, more so when American federalism evolved and transformed in obedience to the dynamics of that country's politics, as observed by Oyovbaire (1979) who, therefore, defines federalism as the interaction between conflicts, consensus and resources, which normally takes place in an arena-a value system which underpins the perception of these phenomena by political actors-once societal forces had called federalism into existence, the arena of interaction itself becomes a factor in the political process. It, therefore, tends to acquire a legitimacy of its own. If the legitimacy is rooted, society can be said to possess a "federal attitude or lack of it in a case of "converse experience" (Ojo, 2003; Ojo, 2009).

To avert the shortcomings of Wheare's postulations about federalism, Fredrick says that federalism is a process rather than design; any particular design or pattern of competences or jurisdiction is merely a phase, a short-run view of a continually-evolving political reality (Fredrick, 1964). An avid reader may like to ask: How can we identify a federal system of government if we see one? This is very simple indeed. Fredrick (1965) sets out the following requisite conditions that any political entity is expected to possess before it can be so regarded: (a) an assembly of representatives of the component communities, which often institutes the league, usually by way of a charter or treaty and amends it when necessary; (b) an executive establishment of sorts to carry out the decisions of the assembly; and (c) an arbiter or judicial body interpreting the treaty in its bearing upon the relation between them and the league as a whole, thus seeking to eliminate the recourse to arms.

Another notable scholar of federalism is Livingston, who also looked beyond the legal formulation of the general systemic view. He asserts that the essential nature of federalism is to be sought for, but in the shaping of legal force-economic, social, political or cultural-they have made the outward forms of federalism necessary... (Livingston, 1956) He avers further that the essence of federation is not in the constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself. Federal government is a devise by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected. Livingston (1956) classifies federal political systems into two: there is the formal constitutional dimension which is the unwritten constitution and which has to do with the existence of a charismatic leader, national political party, and existence of external military or diplomatic threat, real or assumed, national disaster and military intervention.

Although, Livingston's (1956) definition took the sociological dimension, William Riker has picked holes in his juristic element entirely. He says that there are two prerequisites to federalism which are necessary and sufficient. The first, according to him, is expansion condition and the second, military condition. Riker believes that these two pre-conditions are essential in a federal system. On the former, he claims that leaders are likely to agree to unite if they expect to participate in a foreign adventure, and if leaders expect an aggression from outside to attack them, they unite. A consideration of these two conditions would reveal that Riker is pre-occupied with unification and sees federations evolving through unification rather than disintegration (Riker, 1964).

Conclusively, rather than extend my postulations on the conceptualisation of federalism endlessly, I shall do better to ask the question that readily comes to mind: how does one discern a federal system of government? (Ojo, 2009). Or put differently, which polity qualifies to be called a federal state? More so, in the face of numerous postulations of which Frankel compounded our puzzle with an identification of as many as 400 types of federal

models (Frankel, 1986)? To this, we can allude to a typology by Dudley (1963) which is still valid for recognition and identification of a federal state with these four possible combinations, viz:

- i. Type 1 – A federal constitution with federal practice
- ii. Type 2 – A non-federal constitution but with federal practice
- iii. Type 3 – A federal constitution but with non-federal practice
- iv. Type 4 – A non-federal constitution with non-federal practice

From this typology, Nigeria represents a polity with a federal constitution to some extent, but non-federal practice in virtually all ramifications, simply because an average Nigerian completely lacks ‘federal spirit’ to drive the system (Ordeshook & Shretrova, 1995). This will be demonstrated later in this lecture while discussing the travails of federalism in Nigeria. This is perhaps the greatest bone of contention in Nigerian federalism and similarly boon of contentment (Ojo, 2002; Ojo, 2005).

The Travails of Federalism in Nigeria

Ever since the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution that laid the foundation for Nigeria’s classical federal arrangement, it has been one stress or the other for the system. Indeed, the heightened disappointment with the convoluting federalism has been exacerbated in the last 25 years of federal democracy. This has resulted in strident calls for alternative model of governments from (*Con*) federal option or, at best, a *political restructuring of the polity* or even at worse, total dismemberment of the country as was the experience of the former Soviet Union (USSR) which came into being as far back as 1914 through the iron fist of Josef Stalin; same year that both the Northern and Southern protectorates of Nigeria were amalgamated. The collapse of former USSR was hinged on Russian hegemony in the federation; this is being replicated in Nigeria, especially with

the perceived political domination of Northern Nigeria in the present convoluting federal arrangement (Ojo, 2009).

In essence, a number of reasons can be adduced for the travails of federalism in recent years. To start-with, the degree of loyalty to the constitution, particularly the sections relating to the formal division of powers between and amongst levels of government are important to federal stability but unfortunately the form and character of the ruling elite is indeed antithetical to federal stability (Ojo, 2024). In as much as federalism is basically a juristic concept, much of its successes or failures would depend on the extent to which the central and constituent governments define their powers, territories and other provisions in the constitution (Ojo, 2015).

A good example of treating the constitution with levity and disdain amongst the tiers of government is the recent judicial intervention in the suit filed by the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Lateef Fagbemi, SAN, challenging the state governors' control of local government funds, thus denying them of their autonomy. The Supreme Court had to declare that government is portioned into three tiers-federal, state and local (The Punch, 2024). In flagrant disobedience to the constitution, state governors became 'emperors' pretending for years as if Nigeria is not a three tiers of government, going by the provisions of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). Surprisingly, months after the Supreme Court gave the judgment against the states maintaining leverage over local government finances through the state joint accounts with local governments; the local government autonomy conundrum is yet to be resolved.

The Supreme Court judgment gave autonomy to the local governments by completely delinking them from any financial control erected by governors. But both the judgment and the bid for financial autonomy have appeared to falter (Ade-Adeleye, 2025). First, the states have outrightly resisted the push for autonomy, until the Minister of Justice threatened them for deliberately and provocatively undermining the Supreme Court

judgment. Second, after their open defiance, the governors sought for more time to resolve some technical issues plaguing the account opening with the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). No governor has, however, volunteered any explanation on whether those technical details have been fully and satisfactorily resolved or even partially resolved (The Nation, 2007).

Other than some few states which have prepared to sustain their defiance of the Supreme Court judgment and demonstration of their opposition to local government autonomy, others have been clever by not being committal to landmark judgment. The reason is that they remain unconvinced that local governments can run their affairs by themselves and that they can run into bankruptcy if given the autonomy. They also fear that once local governments enjoy financial autonomy, it is just one or two steps away from lack of respect to the governors. At the bottom, all the controversies about local government financial autonomy are a reflection of the contradictions contained in a few provisions of the 1999 constitution.

In the words of a one-time Chief Justice of Nigeria, Alfa Belgore, the elite are making terrible encroachments into the constitution; our elite are very selfish people. The constitution is supposed to be a very sacred document but our people don't have respect for it. Whereas everything in the constitution is like a gentleman's agreement between the state and the people, which must be respected (The Nation, 2018). Thus, any federal arrangement like Nigeria's where the Constitutions are not taken as an upright and sacred document that must be respected by all, no matter how highly-placed, coupled with rare obedience to court verdicts; federalism will definitely run into troubled waters. In essence, operators of the system at all levels of government need to evolve a completely different attitude to the organic document of the state.

As if to compound the problem of the federal structure in Nigeria, the polity runs a 'weak' or 'soft' state with limited enforcement of rules or laws rather than rigorous and consistent enforcement. It is one in which private advantage can be gained

and private bargains struck concerning the enforcement or otherwise of the rules, as when a businessman bribes a tax official. Besides money, another inducement is kinship sentiment while yet another is the favour of superiors. The consequential effect of all these is that in several cases, individuals may be too powerful than the state, in which the rule of law is abused with impunity (Onyeoziri, 2005).

Unlike Switzerland's federation which, in spite of being smaller in size compared with Nigeria, is one of the most decentralised federations in the world, as noted by Koller (2002), Nigeria's federal arrangement is highly over-centralised. This is antithetical to the canons of true federalism (Ojo, 1999). Unlike what obtains in the Switzerland federation, Nigeria is perhaps the most centralised federation in the whole world. It is indeed absurd that Nigeria has a commission called Universal Basic Education Commission (UBEC) in charge of primary schools. One may ask: what is the business of the federal government on the number or philosophy of primary schools in the locality? The centralisation tendency is not unconnected with the mentality of the drafters of the 1979 Constitution which was adopted almost wholly by the 1999 Constitution.

The open confession of the late Prof. Ben Nwabueze shortly before his demise lends credence to this that, as a result of the civil war experience, the centre was made more powerful, contrary to the philosophy of federalism; making the system look more like a *unitary system* than a *federal democracy*. The concomitant effect, for now, is what students of Nigerian federalism calls '*federal immobilism* (Ojo, 2009). The system is not working as it should and at the same time badly beleaguered. Ever since the military constitution was imposed on the polity, politicians and public policy makers have not found it easy to influence constitutional amendments that could whittle down the overbearing influence of the octopus federal government in a plural and deeply divided society like Nigeria.

This segment of the lecture will be incomplete without beaming its searchlight on the problematic nature of Nigerian

citizenship, which has, in no small measure, undermined the efficacy of the federal architecture, unlike India where there is no dual citizenship, in which case, there is only one Indian citizenship and where the concept of a state citizen does not exist also in contemporary Indian state (Koller, 2002). To be employed outside one's ethnic enclave in Nigeria, especially at state level, is a very big risk, career-wise, in the sense that such a person will bear the burden or toga of a non-indigene (Ojo, 2009).

Indeed, there is a conscious notion of 'my state' or 'my home' which afflicts every Nigerian who lives outside his/her state of origin and makes him/her go home to get married to a wife or husband, build a house, or vote'. Even the dead are rarely buried outside their states of origin. The implication of this is that citizens' allegiance to the federation is truncated because of the respective state's preferential treatment of its citizens (Osaghae, 1987). It is so unpalatable that the legal connotation of citizenship in Nigeria is making the idea of National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme to be counter-productive.

Aside from Lagos State and Federal Capital Territory (FCT) that appear detribalised, to be posted to a state outside one's ethnic enclave after the mandatory one year service, the state of domicile may not employ such a graduate. The best such a graduate can get is a contract job, and just for a while. This is a sad reality of Nigeria's problematic citizenship, both legally and sociologically. To be resident in a state for decades does not guarantee being qualified to contest elections in such a state, aside from very few instances.

In the same vein, the recent happenings in the series of Nigeria's federal travails is indeed more absurd, in the sense that '*local potentates*' have virtually hijacked federal tertiary institutions in their domains; that should be a symbol of national unity; intended to enhance national integration. Thus, making nonsense of the notion of 'universality' in most federal universities across the country. Those who venture to pick up job, both teaching and non-teaching, with these federal

universities seems to have mortgaged their future; they experience terrible marginalisation or stagnation, which is a constant reminder of the absurdities of Nigerian federalism (Ojo, 2015).

For analytical simplicity, no Yoruba or Hausa person is currently serving as Vice-Chancellor of any university in the far North and vice-versa; same for the Hausa/Fulani stock. No matter how committed a non-indigene may be, there is a limit to which he/she can rise within the system. This is a constant reminder of the inability of public policy makers to achieve national integration since independence in 1960. Yet, the citizens who are badly discriminated against pay taxes and perform other civic obligations in their states of domicile (Ojo, 2015).

It is absurd also that children of federal civil servants in other states aside from theirs pay higher school fees for their children in state tertiary institutions because they are tagged ‘on-indigenes’ in spite of the fact that they pay their taxes and other levies to their states of domicile. A system like Nigeria where the state cannot effectively tackle the problem of citizenship negates the tenets of federalism. Laski’s view is indeed apt here. He states that: “a state must give to men their dues as men before it can demand, at least with justice, their loyalty” (Laski, 1982; Osaghae, 1987).

Furthermore, Nigeria’s politics and dynamics of fiscal federalism are warped. It is a case of ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’. A typical example is the proposed plan by the federal government, not long ago, to tax the purchase of petrol at pump price, as provided for in the Federal Road Maintenance Agency (FERMA) Act. Describing the collection of any such levy by the federal government as unconstitutional, a former Governor of Lagos State, Babatunde Fashola, SAN, argued, and rightly too, that the proposed tax ought to be collected by Lagos State within which the commodity is consumed. Fashola buttressed his argument by pointing out that Lagos State has 592 state roads, 8,402 local government roads and 25 federal roads, with the state

having to bear the burden of the attendant heavy vehicular tonnage on the vast road network.

He stated further on the bad fiscal policy thus:

The federal government is already collecting royalties on extraction of crude oil, taxing the profits of oil companies at about 30 per cent, taking 52.68 per cent of the national revenues and leaving 36 states and 774 local governments with 26.72 per cent and 20.60 respectively (The Nation, 26th January, 2018).

Another major problem with the federal structure that cannot be overlooked as it exists in Nigeria is structural imbalance that has given rise to asymmetric relationship (Ojo, 2008). A federation is morbid if one part of it is bigger than the sum of the other parts (Ayoade, 1988). A glance at the map of Nigeria presents a gloomy picture of a behemoth north that can swallow the rest of the country, especially in terms of landmass and census figures; whereas no federation succeeds where one part is superior to others (Ayoade, 2021).

Presently, the north has more states, local government areas, Senators, House of Representatives members and greater percentage of share of the national cake. This has given rise to what is called 'Monarchical Spirit' or sense of ownership. When it comes to power oscillation, the north must consent because of the 'tyranny of the majority'; leaving other parts of the country perpetually at its mercy in joint deliberations and power sharing. If not, it could have been practically impossible to achieve informal power oscillation to the south. No doubt, one of the absurdities of federalism in Nigeria is the way colonial masters welded the two protectorates-northern and southern protectorates-together without taking into consideration the practical implications of the asymmetric relationships vis-à-vis national integration.

It was in an attempt by the late General Sani Abacha-led military regime to assuage the feelings of marginalization that brought about division of the country into six geo-political and

administrative zones viz: (a) North-West (seven states); (b) North-East (six states); (c) North-Central (six states); (d) South-West (six states); (e) South-East (five states) and (f) South-South (six states) (**Ojo**, 2009).

Consequent upon the mismanagement of the federal system, especially through religious biases on the part of the managers of the system, there has been a dramatic surge in xenophobic expressions, the hardening of ethno-regional positions and the proliferation of ethnic-militias that have unleashed varying degrees of violence and terrorism on the polity (Egwu, 2001). In spite of the efforts being made to curtail ethnic wars in Nigeria, the problem has been on the increase, especially since May 1999, when civil rule returned (Newswatch, 30th August, 1999). Three broad types of religious violence in Nigeria were identified, viz:

- intra-religious disturbances which occur between different denominations or sects;
- inter-religious conflicts prevalent between adherents of different religious beliefs but capable of assuming socio-ethnic dimension; and
- inter-religious conflicts which, though have socio-economic origins, end up in the form of religious conflicts (Ikenga-Metuh, 1994).

The foundation of religious crisis was laid as far back as the Second Republic (1979–1983). As observed by Ayoade (1987), religious biases have proved to be another form of poor power distribution in Nigeria's federalism. For instance, in the Second Republic, country-wide, Moslems obtained about 70 per cent of all executive and board positions; the trend continues unabated. On the other hand, the north too is less comfortable with southern domination of strategic sectors of the economy, especially the bureaucracy. Perhaps the most recent example of such bias is the Moslem-Moslem ticket of the ruling party before the 2023 presidential elections. Despite all rationalizations to the contrary, the party stuck to its gun (**Ojo**, 2000; **Ojo** & Sadeeq, 2023). It is not surprising, therefore, that since 1999, Nigeria has

been battling with the problem of ethno-religious conflicts that has defied all solutions and at heavy cost to the state in terms of human and material losses. There are reports of complicity on the part of political actors, proving once again that Nigeria is a 'weak state' where laws are made but either not enforced or selectively enforced, thereby crippling the polity.

A survey of ethno-religious conflicts from 1999 till date shows that they are worrisome developments which threaten harmonious co-existence and jeopardise the unity of the Nigerian state and its fledgling democratic experiment far more than any other challenge of democratic sustenance and consolidation. Sad enough, the state seems to lack the proper perspective of handling the reality of religion, thus further authenticating the fact that Nigeria is a complex society, with a multiplicity of religious and cultural allegiances and sensibilities. The least the government can do is to come to terms with the reality of Nigeria's multi-religious status, recognise rights and ensure that religious rights of all Nigerians are equally protected (Clifford, 2002). This is visible only if the country can be sincerely secular, as provided for in the 1999 Constitution (as amended) (Ojo, & Sadeeq, 2023).

Also, we cannot but identify ethnicity as another major travail of federalism in Nigeria. Friction and tension among the ethnic groups are recurrent phenomena. Cultivation of a national outlook has given way to a continued lukewarm attitude to nation-building by the frustrated "nations" whose emotions are stirred by the clandestine ethnic organisations coordinating the races in the hot race for relevance within the polity (Oladesu, 2002; Ojo, 2004). Coupled with these are the negative attitudes of the top elite in the society. In a perceptive work, Osaghae (2019) captured this thus: Nigerian federalism and state floundered because the elite politics whose high point is state capture, takes precedence over compelling social and economic considerations that are capable of expanding the common good and reinforcing the basis of union, as is the case in many other federal systems.

Finally, in view of all the aforementioned travails of federalism over the years (Ojo, 2017), an author recently concluded that Nigeria's federal arrangement is not only a fraud but "a road to nowhere" (Isola, 2020). No wonder Nigerians are deeply divided now more than how they were before the 30-month agonising civil war. The inauguration of democracy in 1999 has led to the fulfilment of Gurr's (1968) theory of 'rising expectation and rising frustration' owing to the mismanagement of the federal architecture which has beclouded whatever achievement federalism has made over the years (Ojo, 2017; Ojo, 2019).

Federalism in Nigeria: An Appraisal

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, the thrust of this segment of the lecture is to determine whether or not federalism has been a successful option for Nigeria or not. Perhaps, the answer will be adequately provided if we ask ourselves what it is that Nigerians want in federalism. And what is it that federalism, by its nature, is capable of giving? Although, having been practising it since 1954 and surviving all the shocks, including a civil war, one may be tempted to say that federalism is a good option for Nigeria. This is because the expected unity in diversity cum stability that its founding fathers desired has not been attained. At this juncture, one may need to emphasise like Ayoade (2021) does that unity is not foundational; unity is a derivative of the performance of government. It is not human to expect love from somebody that is oppressed. We go on talking about unity in diversity.

Unity in diversity is a contradiction. The much orchestrated unity in diversity which forms the hub of Nigerian federalism is informed by the desire to secure good governance based on liberty and the guarantee of the corporate liberties of the parties to the federal bargain. Restricting and dividing the governing power and granting a participatory role in government to the states can only do this. However, the ambition has remained only absolutely possible but tangibly unviable. The

reason for this is not far-fetched if one considers how the operators of the system manipulated it to their selfish advantage. Diamond (1973) has asserted that all political institutions and processes are intelligible only in the light of the purpose or ends for which men device them or which they come to serve.

Thus, if federalism has not taken Nigeria to the Promised Land, it may be that she has not, up till now, addressed herself to defining the goals and objectives desired from the system, or that she desires too much from the system, which federalism may be incapable of accomplishing. Ayoade (1988 p.8) expresses this dilemma of rising expectation and rising frustration thesis as regards federalism poignantly thus:

The federal system recognises and nurtures original division in a society such that it can only at best produce federal unity as *opposed to undifferentiated consolidated unity*. In fact, to expect federalism to produce seamless unity is to expect too much from federalism, which it is not designed to give. Experience has, however, shown that it has not integrated plural societies to a single political system. The purpose is to separate the active and/or passive belligerent units, strengthen them to collectively solve the problems that would have overwhelmed them severally.

From all indications, the system has not been all that successful in Nigeria (Ojo, 2020). If it has been and is devoid of frustrations and disaffections, the repeated calls for alternative models would have been unwarranted. For instance, one can easily recall that Onabanjo, a former Second Republic Governor of Ogun State, called for con-federal arrangement as a more realistic option for Nigeria than the federalism of the 1979 Constitution which, in his words, “fails to take cognisance of the diversity which constitutes the greatest potential of greatness in our country (Onabanjo, 1983). To lend credence to this, Frankel (1986) expressed the view that politically, Nigeria would be more stable if it were split into two or three federations.

Similarly, the late Muḥammad Ghadaffi, the erstwhile strong man of Libya, made same suggestion.

Within Nigeria itself, there have been agitations for confederacy as a more realistic solution to the country's problems of unity and stability (Suberu, 1990). Since Onabanjo's call, notable Nigerians have also, of recent, demonstrated their frustrations and lack of faith in the federal solution to Nigeria's perennial problem of instability and nation-building efforts, thereby suggesting numerous political models such as "Consensus Government", "Diarchy", "National Government", "Government by Natural Rulers", among several others.

Tam David-West, a virologist and former federal minister, considered the problem of Nigerian federalism so daunting to the extent that he inferred that:

...if all the above are not reasons sufficient enough for us to try other models of governance, then I'm afraid we are simply playing the proverbial desert ostrich, a dangerous illusion" (Sunday Tribune, 1992).

He went further to say that:

The laboratory of Nigerian politics has eloquent data to impel us to try another model of governance" (Sunday Tribune, 1992).

Visualising the possible disintegration of Nigerian federation during the ill-fated Third Republic, the former military president, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida (rtd.) invited senior military officers from the rank of one-star general to Abuja for a thorough discussion on the future corporate existence of the Nigerian federation as a political entity. This was on 25 August, 1992. At the meeting, the military officers resolved to keep Nigeria one. The president was reported to have stated that: "we will be prepared at any time to fight for the corporate existence of the country" (Nigerian Tribune, 2009). Assuming that there were no danger signs about the corporate existence of Nigeria, the meeting would not have been necessary. Much later, Bola Ige, a federal Attorney-General/Minister of Justice and first

Executive Governor of the old Oyo State, was reported to have told a news magazine that:

What really bothers me, however, is that because of the injustice that is being done to the youths, they might not be as keen as some of us on the continued unity of this country ... I think many youths, male and female, think that maybe the option is for different groups to go their separate ways (Tell Magazine, p. 10).

Aside individuals expressing their frustrations about the system in recent times, an open threat of secession by the Sardauna province of the present day Borno State in 1995 is another instance of frustration, occasioned by improper management of the system. That segment of the federation had felt oppressed and suppressed for a long time (Third Eye on Sunday). The consequence was their open threat to break away from the federation. What all these boil down to is that all has not been well with the system, with the country faced with series of secessionist agitations.

Despite the transition from military rule to civil rule in May 1999, the system is yet to provide any ray of hope. Within the first 26 years of democratic experience which, expectedly, is supposed to boost federal practice, the story is not different. In a survey by Osuntokun (2000), everybody seems to be going their different ways; some are declaring their Islamic states with the full force of Sharia operating in them against the letters and spirit of the Nigerian constitution. Para-military forces are appearing to take over the normal work of the police in protecting the citizens from hoodlums and armed robbers.

There is a declaration of interest in the South-south states to take over the petroleum resources in their region and pay taxes to the federal government. Lagos and states of the South-west too, from where about 70 percent of Value Added Tax (VAT) is collected, are also demanding this source of revenue should be kept by the states from where it is collected. In addition, instead of democracy to help the system integrate,

the problem is being compounded by emergence of ethnic militias threatening national stability and security.

Nevertheless, each zone of the country seems to have one or more militia groups. In the South-west, the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) holds sway; the South-south parades the Egbesu Boys; the South-east has the Bakassi Boys; while the North has the Arewa Boys, all championing ethnic and primordial interests, with the attendant threats to the stability and integration of the polity. (Amuta, 2000) Indeed, prolonged military rule has bastardised the federal arrangement more than any other factor. By virtue of its being "commandist and paternalistic", the military has antithetical dispositions to federalism. Successive military governments greatly promoted distortions of the federal balance, with civilian governments unable to untangle many bobby traps in the unworkable constitution inherited from the military era.

Restructuring: The Dynamics

In contemporary Nigeria, the latest *lingua* in virtually everybody's mouth is restructuring. Indeed, the call for restructuring is so deafening that both the ruling party and government cannot afford to close either their ears or eyes to it or see it as mere noise in the market place by the opposition elements. Interestingly however, the views about that singular word 'restructuring' is as diverse as the people agitating for it; thus, making it nebulous. For any undiscerning mind, attempts to decipher or comprehend restructuring in the Nigerian context may result in more confusing and/or outright lack of clear understanding (Ajimobi, 2017). Besides, how are we sure that what restructuring means to the Yoruba nation is what it is to those in the South-East? Who says that restructuring, in the understanding of the South-south geo-political zone, depicts similar thing to those in the North-east? Thus, like the saying goes, different strokes for different folks. And that is exactly what the concept and idea of restructuring appears to be in contemporary Nigeria (Ojo, 2019).

For instance, while it means secession to the *Biafran* irredentists, that is, separatist agitators, some consider restructuring to amount to the implementation of the 2014 national political conference, and yet, others will simply tell you it means absolute control of the resources at the disposal of each region or state. To some others, the presidential system of government should be put into abeyance and regionalism embraced, just like parliamentary system of government during the regional governments in the First Republic. To others, the solution to the skewed, asymmetric and convoluting federal arrangement in Nigeria lies in the wholesale adoption of the report of the 2014 Constitutional Conference. This is in deference to those who simply conclude that the latest demand for restructuring, undoubtedly, is an open expression of frustration by Nigerians. However, in a perceptive essay, Gbadegesin (2017) suggested that from the various positions that have been canvassed in this matter (i.e. restructuring), we should comprehend political restructuring in three senses, ranging from the simple to the complex.

For him, ‘the most daring restructuring idea is regionalization, plus full fiscal autonomy. This is tantamount to the six geographical and administrative zones serving as federating units with full control over their natural resources, while they only pay royalty and taxes to the federal government. A less daring idea of restructuring points to the present 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) structure as incongruous as the foundation of a true federal system. In the First Republic, the regions were economically viable due to the economy of scale that each enjoyed. With the proliferation of states, the advantages that accrued to the former regions based on their territorial scope are, however, lost to the present states-structure (Gbadegesin, 2017).

For the purposes of this lecture, restructuring, in its simplest form however, is devolution of powers from the centre to the component units in all ramifications. In a federation, the component units are the states or regions, where the centre is

saddled with fewer responsibilities that could possibly be discharged as effectively as the component units; then it needs to shed some weights and transfer resources to the states for them to take on those responsibilities efficiently more so having taking charge of solid mineral resources in their respective domains (Ojo, 2011). In his own contribution, a notable student of federalism, Osaghae (2018) noted that the federal system of government practised in Nigeria could only work through restructuring. This is because federal systems are delicate and difficult to manage (Osaghae, 2019; Janda, Berry & Goldman, 1992). Thus, their success cannot be guaranteed or taken for granted, more so that research confirmed that the number of ailing federal systems outnumbers the successful ones.

Restructuring, therefore, represents a continuous correction, adjustment and reconfiguration process by which the federal system works and reworks its instrumentalities; this is to guarantee success and efficiencies of federalism. Osaghae (2018) infers that the federal instrumentalities of governance are expected to respond to ‘changing dynamics, demands and stimuli, which changed in consonance with changing imperatives. This is the kernel of the restructuring debacle in Nigeria.

As far back as 1993, the Movement for National Reformation (MNR), after expressing profound frustration with the federal system, published a position paper advocating for the restructuring of Nigeria into a union of the following eight federations, viz:

- (a) Western federation – comprising the present Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states;
- (b) South-Central federation – comprising the present Edo and Delta states;
- (c) East-Central federation – comprising the present Abia, Anambra, Enugu and Imo states.
- (d) South-Eastern federation – comprising the present Akwa-Ibom, Cross River and Rivers states.

- (e) Central federation – comprising the present Bauchi, Benue, Kaduna and Plateau states.
- (f) North-Eastern federation – comprising the present Adamawa, Borno, Taraba and Yobe states.
- (g) Northern federation – comprising Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi and Sokoto states.
- (h) West-Central federation – comprising Niger, Kogi, Kwara States (Ojo, 2019).

Despite the MNR's elaborate proposals and those of others which are technically *con-federal* option but the viability of a Nigerian confederation is bogus indeed. According to Chuba Okadigbo (of blessed memory), a former Senate President:

...Nigerian confederation, though perhaps desirable, will be very difficult to negotiate and even harder to create ... who will implement con-federal plan? – the soldiers from Northern Nigeria with cards placed face down or those from the Middle Belt...who may become very vulnerable to domination by their brethren of the far Northern sector? Or do the advocates of confederacy think that Nigerians will gladly gather round in table and gleefully dispense of the federation and its resources by sheer appeal to simple and often fraudulent geographical stratification? (African Concord, 1986, p. 11&12).

Moreover, given the volatility and complexity of Nigeria's cultural divisions, it should be obvious that the country's ethnic problems would not disappear in a loose confederation (Diamond, 1987). But the most compelling argument against confederation is that it is actually a polite strategy for the dissolution of Nigeria (African Concord, 1986). As West Africa (1985) opines, a debate about confederation can hardly be described as a discussion about Nigeria's political future, it is more about how to end the existence of Nigeria as an entity in future. As recent as 2024, a national body spearheading the restructuring project of Nigeria known as 'New Nigeria Movement' came up with another flamboyant idea of

restructuring that will bring Nigeria to some ten regions of five region each in both the North and the South viz:

Five Regions in the South

1. **Western Region:** of all Yoruba-speaking peoples, plus the Bini/Edo and Itsekiri peoples who, based on ancient ties have chosen to stay with the Yoruba.
2. **Eastern Region:** of all Igbo-speaking peoples, plus whoever in the South or Middle Belt who may wish to join with the Ibo in an expanded Eastern Region.
3. **Niger Delta Region:** basic homeland of all Ijaw-speaking peoples, covering a very long coastline, may be more than or up to half of Nigeria's entire seashore, between the Forcados/Burutu channel by the west and the New Calabar or Kalabari River by the east, with possibly over 20 developable but Nigeria-neglected coastal ports, and without prejudice to many other Ijaw previously fishing outposts, now exclaves, westwards even beyond Lagos and eastwards beyond Cameroon which, if blanketed or joined together in an artificial "Ijaw contiguous ownership" would block off practically all previous coastal nationalities from the coastlines in breach of timeless traditions.
4. **Southern Region:** of the Ogoni and Andoni-speaking peoples, sandwiched between the west-wing Igbo sea lane of Bonny to Port Harcourt, and east-wing Igbo sea-lane of Azumini to Opobo along the Imo River basin. The Nkoro, a possible Ijaw exclave is located hereabouts and shall be fully protected.
5. **South-Eastern Region:** of the related Annang-Efik-Etu-Ibibio Central-Oro-speaking peoples, plus the Ekoi-Ogoja peoples. This is merely a return to the "South-eastern State" of 1967, benefiting from the economy of scale and stronger Nigerian eastwards trading lines.

All the above coastal demarcations are natural, and perfectly coincide with the peaceful relationships with the South before Nigeria started happening to everyone; they are substantially reflected in the Willink's Report, in various texts by European explorers, as well as aspects of Nigerian coastal history and maritime traditions.

Five Regions in the North

6. **Northern Region:** of liberated Hausa-speaking and democratised Fulani peoples, in a proscribed caliphate system and Hausa majority rule akin to post-Apartheid South Africa. A democratised Fulani shall live solely under Nigerian law and protection as other nationalities do, not a parallel caliphate authority urging the otherwise peaceful Fulani into perpetual war with others for spaces they could ordinarily buy, rent, peacefully settle and use. Under this democratic arrangement, both Hausa and Fulani shall electorally find themselves in power.
7. **North-East Region:** of the Kanuri-speaking and possibly allied peoples.
8. **Western Middle Belt Region:** of the Baruba-Busawa-Gbagyi-Nupe speaking and other peoples.
9. **Central Middle Belt Region:** of the Angas-Birom-Katab-Ebira-Igala-Igede-Idom-speaking peoples and related others.
10. **Eastern Middle Belt Region:** of the Bata-Chamba-Longuda-Marghi-Mumjye-Tangale-speaking peoples, etc.

There shall be provisions for internal regional restructurings and Constitutions, so that constituent parts of a Region now to coexist peacefully together and for prospective mergers between Regions or parts thereof which, ultimately, would render obsolete, notions of North or South.(New Nigeria Movement advertorial, Sunday Tribune, 5th March, 1992).

One cannot easily ignore the extreme position of secessionists who believe strongly that Nigeria is better if dismembered. One of such groups is the Yoruba Peoples of Nigeria, coordinated by Yoruba Global Coalition. On March 22, 2021 they wrote His Excellency, Mr Antonio Guterres – Secretary General, United Nations and Her Royal Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II of England through Rt. Honourable Boris Johnson, - former Prime Minister, United Kingdom, Her Royal Majesty’s Government demanding peaceful exit through a process of PLEBISCITE to be supervised by the United Nations, in Yoruba Nation. In the memoranda sent to the aforementioned, it was declared that “we the peoples of Yoruba nationality consisting of the following peoples:

Akoko	Asori	Ekiti	Eko	Egba	Egbado
Egbe	Egun	Ibarapa	Ife	Ijebu	Ijesha
Ikale	Ilaje	Ilorin	Igbomina		Itshekiri
Okun	Okeogun	Ondo	Onko		Oshun
Owo	Oworo	Oyo	Owu	Remo	

Otherwise referred to as WESTERN REGION of NIGERIA in Sir Fredrick Lugard Amalgamation document of January 1914, hereby indicate our collective decision to exit from the union of Nigeria as constituted by Sir Fredrick Lord Lugard Amalgamation of Northern Protectorate and Southern Protectorate into one nation named NIGERIA on January 1, 1914.(Memoranda for Yorubaland Independence, (undated).

Another group advocating for restructuring of the federal architecture along regionalism is an Ibadan-based Rebirth Movement which has also come up with a flamboyant proposal for Nigeria’s future rejig of the federal arrangement. For space constraints, we can capture the proposal in few words.“Our proposed constitutional arrangement outlines to birth: “The United Regions of Nigeria” (URN); which will be a symmetric federal state, granting all regions equal status and powers” (Oladejo, 2023). The new nation-state will consist of autonomous, self-governing regions, with rotational leadership at its centre, with the following governance structures.

1. Central Parliament
2. Central Executive Council (CEC)
3. Central Council of Elders (CCE) and
4. National Council of States (Oladejo, 2023).

The proposal went on to develop a new governance model for the United Regions of Nigeria, advocating for rotational presidency along geo-political zones by taking care of all the zones simultaneously thus:

Table I: New Model for the United Regions of Nigeria Governmental Organogram

Position	Zone	Zone	Zone	Zone	Zone	Zone
Prime Minister	A	B	C	D	E	F
Deputy Prime Minister	B	C	D	E	F	A
Speaker	C	D	E	F	A	B
Deputy Speaker	D	E	F	A	B	C
President	E	F	A	B	C	D
Deputy President	F	A	B	C	D	E

Source: Oladejo (2023, p. 51)

The above proposal accommodates traditional rulers for them to be relevant in governance. The body concluded its recommendations by adding that constituent units shall control and retain all resources and revenues within their natural jurisdictions, including territorial waters, and pay federal and regional taxes according to the law, thus:

- (a) District (Local Government Areas) - 30%
- (ii) Province (States) - 25%
- (iii) Region - 25%
- (iv) Central Government - 20% (Oladejo, 2023 p. 15)

With another consensus that confederacy may not be a viable option after all, we can take a cue from the position of the

ruling party, All Progressives Congress (APC), in an advertorial in some national dailies after its committee on restructuring went round the country. The report makes some remarks on major issues that affect the future of Nigeria as an integrated country. The report revolves around the followings:

1. Creation/Merger of States
2. Derivation Principle
3. Devolution of Powers
4. Federating Units
5. Fiscal Federalism and Revenue Allocation
6. Form of government
7. Independent Candidacy
8. Land Tenure System
9. Local Government Autonomy
10. Power sharing and Rotation
11. Resource Control
12. Type of Legislatures (The Nation, 26th January, 2018),

Bipolar or Tripartite Federalism

Vice-Chancellor, Sir, contemporary debate vis-à-vis Nigerian federalism has shifted from bipartite to tripartite model. Hitherto, federal system was understood to consist of two levels of government. The level of the Central government and the level of the constituent units (Greene & De Schutter, 2023). Until very recently and specifically on 11 July, 2024 when the Supreme Court of Nigeria ruled on a case brought by the Federal Government (FGN) concerning the autonomy of local councils as the third tier of government, Nigeria operates two tier federal model (Aiyede, 2024). With the landmark judgment, Nigeria has legally transformed into a tripartite federal model. In a bipolar federal arrangement, there are usually two main levels: (a) a national, central or federal level, and (b) a state, provincial or regional level (Bulmer, 2011). One unique feature of American federal model is that US citizens would be subjected to two overlapping authorities in the federal and the state government, each having direct legislative power in their respective

constitutionally prescribed spheres of competence. This created the model from which all subsequent federal systems have been (directly or indirectly) derived (Bulmer, 2011). A number of bipolar federal governments across the world includes: United States of America, Germany, South Africa and Nigeria, until very recently.

Meanwhile, it is now widely accepted that no federal system can flourish without adapting to new circumstances and without having the capacity to modify its institutional architecture so as to improve efficiency and accountability (Benz, 2013; Colino, 2013). In the words of Geenees and De Schutter (2023), federalism, well understood, would find its most complete institutional expression in a three-fold political architecture. Though, this may not be a reason to tinker with well-functioning bipartite systems, but in the case of Nigeria, where state governors have suffocated the local government system leading to their complete administrative inertia, a tripartite model is the most ideal.

Meanwhile, the purest, 'ideal-typical' way to escape the conceptual pull from unitarism on the one side and confederalism on the other is to vest the power to alter the federal system in a third, separate entity so that any relation of hierarchy between the different policy levels is avoided. In other words, we claim that a tripartite structure offers the best institutional translation of the idea of federalism. In all these cases, the usage of a tripartite model is a matter of terminology, introduced to achieve greater conceptual clarity in theoretical discussions on federalism and to give us a new way to conceptualize a federation. Thus, these tripartite models are interpretative at most. Nevertheless, in practical reality, tripartite federalism is recognition of three distinct tiers of government, namely: federal, states and local governments. Any federal arrangement that does this will definitely enjoy three major advantages, viz: (i) minority groups enjoying better recognition (ii) the system becomes more efficient and (iii) it promotes democracy most especially, at the grassroots level (Geenees & De Schutter, 2023).

Tripartite federal model, therefore, appears to be the most suitable for Nigeria's level of development and desire for fast development. The current state of administrative inertia in virtually all the local government areas in the country is uncalled for. A properly constituted tripartite federal arrangement is most suitable for Nigeria's existential reality. This is in line with the view of Gambari (2025), when he postulated that "a radical restructuring of the Nigerian federal arrangement with a view to significantly devolving power to the people at the community level where most exercise their livelihoods" (Sunday Tribune, 2025). This calls for a more comprehensive attention to the country's local government system, as part of a bold effort at promoting a new bottom-up approach to governance, development, participation, and security.

Community Service

Mr. Vice-Chancellor, Sir, my major community services:

- a. Aside from teaching and research from Political Science Department, I was appointed as Ag. Head of Department on a number of occasions:
 - (i). December, 2008 – August, 2009;
 - (ii). 23rd February, 2020 – 2021
 - (iii). 1st August, 2003 – 31 July, 2004
- b. Departmental Examination Officer (2003 – 2004)
- c. MPA Seminar Coordinator (2003 – 2004)
- d. Member, University of Ilorin Students' Essay Competition (2005 – 2007)
- e. Member, Faculty Coffee Room Management Committee Faculty of Business and Social Sciences in year 2000.
- f. Level Adviser, 100 Level (1995 – 1998)
- g. Level Adviser, 300 Level (1998 – 1999)
- h. Level Adviser 400 Level (2003 – 2004)
- i. Programme Organiser, Master in International Studies (2003–2004)

- j. Public talk/presentation to institutions, groups and religious houses in my spare time.
- k. Special Adviser (Political Matters) to Oyo State Governor (18th March, 2014 - May, 2015)
- l. Chief of Staff to former Oyo State Governor between September (2015- February, 2019)
- m. In 1998 I was conferred with the investiture as a Justice of Peace (JP) in Oyo State.

Conclusion

Without gainsaying, Nigerians are indeed resilient to have tolerated the system so far. The problem, however, is the wide gap between intent and actual practices. With political will by public policy makers, Nigeria shall be stable, integrated and develop. The masses need to be well mobilised to achieve integration and development. Not much can be attained without the masses who are supposed to be catalysts for both national integration and national development.

Vice-Chancellor Sir, from the highlighted travails of federalism noted in this lecture, it is imperative that Nigerians properly conceptualise federalism for it to be a pragmatic integrative mechanism. The earlier this is done the better for the system. So that we can all discern how best to worship the *deity* and achieve the much desired national integration..

I am pleased to intimate you that within the focus of my area of study, Comparative Politics, I have made appreciable contributions most especially in Civil-Military Relations (CMR) as a sub-speciality. This earned me fellowship award of the Armed Forces and Society (AF&S) based in Texas State University, US for some five years between 2019 and 2024. I was eventually appointed into the editorial board membership of their first rated journal in America on the study of the military consequent upon my landmark publications – **Ojo**, 2006 & **Ojo**, 2009) amongst others. Similarly, my foray into Legislative Studies is rewarding with two volumes of works that remained reference points till date (**Ojo**, 2014; **Ojo**, 2018).

Recommendations

Vice-Chancellor Sir, for the Social Sciences to maintain its utility and relevance, we need to make few recommendations as a roadmap to a better integrated and viable polity, viz:

- (a) Nigerians should imbibe a 'federal spirit' in all ramifications. This will, no doubt, enhance the principle of justice and equity, and not necessarily equality. 'Federal Spirit' no doubt will truncate ethnic chauvinism.
- (b) The principle of federal character must be strengthened both in job opportunities and infrastructure provisions to enhance spatial development.
- (c) The Land Use Act should be repealed to allow communities naturally endowed with mineral resources to maximally benefit from them rather than the extant system that is known to be 'robbing Peter to pay Paul'. Royalty should be paid to the federal purse rather than federal government taking over solid minerals in state domains.
- (d) A properly restructured federal architecture is of essence for development and national integration; power must be devolved to both the states and localities for an efficient federal system. The earlier this is done, the better for the polity. Local governments need to be reanimated.
- (e) A radical way out is no doubt, a completely brand new Federal Constitution. The extant ground norm is essentially defective and an imposition by the military oligarchy, which has led to '*federal immobilism*'. To achieve that, Nigeria may need to organise a Referendum or Constitutional Convention or Constituent Assembly, whose membership may have to be elected.

- (f) The problematic citizenship in Nigeria must be addressed once and for all. While 'statism' may not be completely abrogated, there is a need to properly conceptualise citizenship both legally and sociologically, so that, to have resided in a place for a minimum of ten years, such a citizen should not be discriminated against in any guise.
- (g) The ever contentious revenue allocation formula must be tinkered with to complement power devolution to the lower tiers of government.
- (h) More importantly, what we need today is a non-centralised federal system in which state governments are politically virile, legislatively strong, and financially resilient and, indeed, constituted into self-confident and self-assertive centres of respect by the political loyalty from the citizens they serve and over whom they exercise authority

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I give all glory, honour and adoration to God Almighty, the Alpha and Omega, for taking all the glory thus far. According to His Words: “I am the Lord, that is my name, my glory I give to no others nor my praise to graven images” – Isaiah 42:8. The good Lord has taken the pre-eminence. However, I am profoundly grateful to all who have played positive roles in getting me to the zenith of my career by complementing the role of God.

I am indeed appreciative to all my teachers from primary school to secondary level, including tertiary level also. I therefore, acknowledge with deep sense of gratitude the invaluable direction and support of Emeritus Professor John A. A. Ayoade of the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan. His tutelage and mentoring assisted greatly. Worthy of mention are Professors A.A.B. Agbaje, ‘Kunle Amuwo’ (of blessed memory) and Emmanuel E. Osaghae, who unknowingly to him, was my source of inspiration. He was the first person to teach me on my first day in the University classroom; indeed his charisma as an effective teacher no doubt, rekindled my interest in the academia. Also, Dr. Busari O. Adebisi (D.Sc.) (of blessed memory) has a place in my heart as a good mentor.

Besides, I also want to place on record the cooperation of and advice of Professor Arthur Ebun Davies (of blessed memory), who incidentally was the Ag. Head of Department, Political Science, UNILORIN, when I was recruited in 1995 as an Assistant Lecturer. He was indeed a detribalised Nigerian and a firm believer in academic freedom that promotes productivity. Though agnostic, the confidence he reposed in me eventually paid off. I like to also say thanks to both the Management team and the entire members of Sanctuary of Christ Evangelical Church, Inc. (SCEC), Ibadan for their prayers and cooperation throughout my frequent absence in the Church to perform my official duties. Their amazing support and prayers aided my career also and the growth of the Church and Ministry.

I cannot easily forget Mr. Folorunso Ajadi (of blessed memory) who trained me the art of typewriting (free-of-charge) for some seven years as an apprentice under him. This eventually facilitated my education from secondary school all through tertiary level. I owe to God and him whatever I may become in life to that skill at a tender age that sustained me as a self-sponsored student.

I also appreciate my father late Elder Ezekiel Aderinto Ojo, who died on 11th of June, 2001. Though, a stark illiterate, but one who valued education tremendously for enrolling me in primary school *ab initio*. He was the *Baba Ewe* of C.A.C. Aremo District Headquarters, Ibadan, Oyo State. A prayer warrior, whose fervent prayers for me availeth much. Likewise, I cannot but remember and appreciate my late mother, Madam Awanatu Ajitoni Ojo, who did not live long to witness the growth and development of her only begotten son or even wait to reap the fruit of her labour. All efforts to trace her grave or get hold of her picture proved abortive! I did not know my mother in person! May her gentle soul rest in perfect peace. Amen.

I also appreciate Senator Abiola Ajimobi, former Executive Governor of Oyo State (of blessed memory) (2011-2019), for initiating me into pragmatic governance, having served in his government as a technocrat - first as **Special Adviser, Political Matters** (18th March, 2014-May, 2015), and later, as **Chief of Staff** (September, 2015-February, 2019). This opportunity made me blend classroom theorising with pragmatic workings of the government cum *politicking*, in practical reality. Let me also say many thanks to colleagues both senior and junior ones in the Department of Political Science of the University of Ilorin, for harmonious working relationship over the years.

As usual the brunt of my being away from home fell heavily on my wife, also an engaging scholar, Professor Christiana 'Ronke Ojo, who bore the burden of my frequent absence from home along with her children, Tope (a Superintendent of Police), Kike (an Economist), Dare (PharmD) and Ayomide (a Barrister in the

making); this gave me the rest of mind required for academic productivity that made me attain this height. Likewise, my son in-laws deserve appreciation, Engr. Tifase and Mr. Olorunwa. I equally appreciate my grand children, Adeyanju and Adewale, for their love.

I cannot but be profoundly appreciative to the successive management teams of this great University over the years for providing me with the conducive, academic milieu which enabled my academic engagements to thrive. I say a big thanks to you all.

Lastly, I am grateful to all individuals who cannot be mentioned for space constraints that have played positive roles in my life.

Many thanks for your rapt attention. God bless you all. Amen.

References

- Ade-Adeleye, A. (2025). LGs, governors and Supreme Court. *The Nation*, Lagos, Sunday, March 30, p. 2.
- Aguda, A. (1998). Why sovereign conference is imperative, *The Guardian*, Lagos, September 25.
- Aiyede, R. (2024). *Beyond Financial autonomy: The imperative of moving from local government to local governance*, AGORA Policy paper.
- Ajimobi, A. (2017). *Restructuring and the future of Nigeria's convoluting federalism*. Text of an address delivered at the zonal public meeting of the All Progressives Congress (APC) committee meeting on True Federalism at the International Conference Centre, University of Ibadan, Monday, September, 18.
- Amuta, C. (2000). Ethnic militias and national security, *The Comet*, Lagos, July, 27, p. 25.
- Atkinson, R. G. (2004). Federalism in a post-modern world. *Bond Law Review*, 1(I), 18 -30.
- Ayoade, J. A. A. (1987). Ethnic management in the 1979 Nigerian Constitution. *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, XIV(1), 170-184.
- Ayoade, J. A. A. (1988). *Federalism in Nigeria: The problem with the solution*. Faculty Lecture. Faculty of the Social Sciences. University of Ibadan, Ibadan, held on July 12.
- Ayoade, J. A. A. (2021). No federation succeeds where one part is superior. *Nigerian Tribune*. Ibadan, October 6. p. 20.
- Benz, A. (2013). Dimensions and dynamics of federal regimes. *Federal Dynamics, Continuity, Change and the Varieties of Federalism*, 39(2), 20-31.
- Bulmer, E. (2011). *Federalism*. International IDEA Constitution-Building, Primer 12, Stockholm, Sweden.
- Chen, P. (1999). Federalism and rights: A neglected relationship. *South Texas Law Review*, iv(40) (Summer). 15-35.
- Clifford, N. (2002). Groups list ways to curb ethno-religious crisis. *The Guardian*. Lagos, January 9.

- Colino, C. (2013). Varieties of federalism and properties for change. *Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change and the Varieties of Federalism*. Arthur Benz and Jorg Broschek (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Diamond, M. (1973). The ends of federalism. *Publius: Journal of Federalism*, 3(2), 18-30.
- Dudley, B. J. (1963). The concept of federalism, *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies*, 5(1), 95-103.
- Egwu, S. G. (2001). *Ethnic and religious violence in Nigeria*. Abuja: African Centre for Democratic Governance.
- Elazar, D. C. (1994). The federal-type solutions in dealing with multi-ethnicity: Confederal examples. *Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs*.
- Frankel, M. (1986). *Federal theory*. Canberra: Centre for Research in Federal Financial Relations. The Australian National University. 180-185.
- Fredrick, C. (1965). *Federalism: National and international*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Fredrick, C. (1964). *New tendencies in federal theory and practice*. Paper presented to the 6th World Conference of the International Political Science Association, (IPSA). USA.
- Gallie, W. B. (1962). Essentially contested concepts. Max Black (ed). *The Importance of Language*, New Jersey, Prentice Hall.
- Gambari, I. A. (2025). *The imperative of good governance: Nigeria in a global comparative perspective*. Keynote address delivered at the 14th Distinguished Chief Emeka Anyaoku Annual Lecture Series held in Enugu on April 29. *Sunday Tribune*, 4 May, Ibadan, 23, 24.
- Gbadegesin, S. (2017). The challenge of restructuring. *The Nation*. Lagos. September 1. p. 47.
- Greenes, R., & De Schmitter, H. (2023). A tripartite model of federalism. *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 49(7), 750-753.

- Gurr, T. (1968). Why men rebel. *American Political Science Review*, 8(10), 50-65.
- Ige, B. (1996). A cover interview with Bola Ige on the future of Nigeria. *Tell Magazine*, Lagos, November 11. pp. 5 – 9.
- Ikengha-Metu, E. (1994). Two decades of religious conflict in Nigeria. *Bulletin of Ecumenical Theology*, 1(6), 10.
- Isola, I. (2020). *A road to nowhere: The 1914 amalgamation of Nigeria and the other issues of nationhood*. John Archers (Publishers) Limited, Ibadan.
- Janda, K., Berry, J. M., & Goldman, J. (1992). *The challenge of democracy: Government in America*, 3rd Ed. Hough Mifflin Company, Dallas Geneva.
- Koller, A. (2002). *Swiss Federation*. Roundtable on Mechanism of Intergovernmental Relations, New Delhi, Institute of Social Sciences, India.
- Laski, H. C. (1982). *A Grammar of Politics*. London, Allen and Unwin.
- Little, R. (1987). Ideology and change. Barry Buzan and R.J. Jones (Eds.) *In: Change and the Study of International Relations*, London. Frances Printers.
- Livingston, W. S. (1956). *Federalism and Constitutional Change*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- New Nigeria Movement. (2024). *Sunday Tribune*, November 10, Ibadan, pp. 24 – 25.
- Newswatch. (1999). August 30, Lagos, pp. 16 – 23.
- Ojo, E. O.** (2002). *Integrative Mechanisms in a Federal State: The case of Nigeria*. Being a Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, September.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2000). Nigeria's new modes of power sharing: A prognosis. *African Notes: An official Journal of the Institute of African Studies*, XXIV(1&2), 44–53. University of Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2001). *Federalism and the challenge of national integration in Nigeria: An observatory note*. Being a paper presented to the National Conference on Policy

- Issues in Nigeria and National Development, hosted by the Faculty of Social Science, Obafemi Awolowo University (OAU), Ile-Ife, Nigeria, February 14 – 16.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2002). An appraisal of the principle and practice of federal character in Nigeria. *Political Science Review*, II(I), 37-52.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2004). Federalism and national cohesion. Ebere Onwudiwe and Rotimi T. Suberu (eds), *Nigerian federalism: Critical perspectives and political option*. Publication of Programme in Ethnic and Federal Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, in conjunction with John Archers (Publishers), Ibadan.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2006). Taming the monster: Demilitarization and democratization in Nigeria Armed Forces and Society. *Journal of Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society*, XXXII(2) (Winter Issues).
- Ojo, O. E.** (2009). *Mechanisms of national integration in a multi-ethnic federal state: The Nigerian experience*. John Archers (Publishers) Limited, Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2009). Federalism and the search for national integration in Nigeria, *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations*, 3(9), 386 – 397.
- Ojo, E. O.** (2009). Guarding the ‘Guardians’: A prognosis of panacea for evolving stable civil-military relations in Nigeria. *Armed Forces and Society*, 35(4), 688-708.
- Ojo, E. O., & Omotola, J. S.** (eds.) (2014). The legislature and governance in Nigeria: A Festschrift for Emeritus Professor John A. A. Ayoade. John Archers (Publishers) Limited, Ibadan.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2015). Federal absurdities and the future of the Nigerian State. *Nigeria’s decent into anarchy and collapse*. John A. A. Ayoade, Adeoye A. Akinsanya & Olatunde J.B. Ojo (eds), John Archers (Publishers) Limited, Ibadan.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2017). The travails of federalism, *The Guardian*, Lagos, June 26. 18

- Ojo, E. O.** (ed) (2018). The legislature and governance in Nigeria: A Festschrift for Emeritus Professor John A.A. Ayoade. John Archers (Publishers) Limited, Ibadan.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2024). The form and character of circulating governing elite in Nigeria: Past and present. *The African Review*. University of Dare es Salam, Tanzania, 1-17.
- Ojo, O. E., & Sadeeq, W.** (2023). Manifestations of ethnicity and religion in 2023 presidential election in Nigeria. *Canadian Social Science*, 19(4), 1-17.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2019). Federalism and restructuring debate in Nigeria. *Contemporary Issues and Perspectives in the Study of Politics*. F. A. Aremu, L. Saka & A.A. Muhammad (Eds). Department of Political Science (A special issue on the series of Political Science Review), University of Ilorin, Kwara State, Nigeria, 40-50.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2024). The imperatives of state police. *The Guardian*. Lagos, May 10. (Back page).
- Ojo, O. E., & Sadeeq, W.** (2023). Manifestations of ethnicity and religion in 2023 presidential election in Nigeria. *Canadian Social Science*, 19(4), 27-39.
- Ojo, O. E.** (1995). Absurdities of Nigerian federalism. *Third Eye on Sunday*, Ibadan, 10 September, p. 7.
- Ojo, O. E.** (1999). Explaining Nigerian politics. *Geo-Studies Forum: An International Journal of Environment and Policy Issues*, I (I), 106–116.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2003). Governance and legitimacy crisis in Nigeria. *Research for Development: An International Journal of African Development*, IIXX(1&2), 103-130.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2005). Federal character principle and national integration in Nigeria. *International Review of Politics and Development*, III(I), 92-118.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2005). Federalism and national cohesion in Nigeria, Ebere Onwudiwe & Rotimi T. Suberu (Eds.). *Nigeria Federalism in Crisis: Critical Perspectives and Political Options*. John Archers (Publishers) Limited, Ibadan.

- Ojo, O. E.** (Ed.) (2006). *Challenges of sustainable democracy in Nigeria*. John Archers Publishers, Ibadan, Nigeria.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2008). The politics of states' and local governments' creation and Nigeria's search for geo-political balancing. *African Research Review*, II(III), 334-367.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2009). Federalism and the search for national integration in Nigeria, *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations: A publication of Academic Journals, United States of America*, 386–397.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2011). Federalism and natural resource management in Africa. *Indian Journal of Federal Studies*, I, 86-103.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2015). Federal absurdities and the future of the Nigerian state. *Nigeria: Descent into Anarchy and Collapse*. John A. A. Ayoade, Adeoye A. Akinsanya, & Olatunde J. B. Ojo (Eds.). Ibadan, John Archers (Publishers) Limited, Nigeria.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2020). Federalism and a rethink of traditional optimism: The case of Nigeria. *African Journal for Security and Development*, III (I), 182-194.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2017). Restructuring and the future of Nigeria's convoluting federalism: The dynamics of the restructuring debate in Nigeria. J.O. Olaniyi & A.A. Mohammad (Eds.). An occasional publication of the Department of Political Science, University of Ilorin, 23-33.
- Ojo, O. E.** (2019). Restructuring and the future of Nigeria's federalism. *African Journal of Security and Development*, II(IV), 203-191.
- Okadigbo, C. (1986). Cover Interview with African Concord. Lagos, August 7, pp. 11& 12.
- Oladejo, O. (2023). *Imperative of Nigeria's rebirth: A pathway to peace and progress*. 3rd Distinguished Eminent Personality Lecture. Political Science and International Relations Programmes, Bowen University, Iwo, Osun State, held on Monday 13th November.

- Oladesu, E. (2002). Revisiting the mistakes of the founding fathers. *The Comet*, Lagos, p.2, October.
- Onabanjo, B. (1983). Let us consider confederation. *Daily Sketch*, Ibadan, October 3.
- Onwujeogwu, M. A. (1995). Indigenous socio-economic and political organisations and their relevance to development in contemporary Nigeria. *Ilorin Journal of Sociology*, 1(2), 60-76.
- Onyeoziri, F. (2005). Federalism and state capacity in Nigeria. *Ibadan Journal of the Social Sciences*, 1(3) (September), 25-30.
- Ordeshook, P. C., & Shretrova, O. (1995). Federalism and constitutional design. *Journal of Democracy*, 8(1) (January), 25-35.
- Osaghae, E. E. (1987). The problem of citizenship in Nigeria, Stephen Olugbemi, O. (Ed.) *Alternative political futures for Nigeria*. NPSA Publication, Lagos.
- Osaghae, E. E. (2018). *Restructuring and true federalism: Nigeria in perspective*. Being a text of 2018 National Open University (NOUN) Convocation Lecture. 19th January.
- Osaghae, E. E. (2019). *What man has joined together: Ethnicity, Federalism and State Politics*. Inaugural Lecture delivered on Thursday, 22 August, 2019. Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Ibadan.
- Osuntokun, J. (2000). The struggle for Nigeria, *The Comet*. Lagos, 27 July. p. 25.
- Oyovbaire, S. E. (1979). The theory of federalism: A critical appraisal. *Nigerian Journal of Political Science*, 1(1), 78-91.
- Riker, W. H. (1964). *Federalism: Origin, operation, significance*, Boston, Little Brown.
- Roy, A. N. (2002). *Introduction, Roundtable on Mechanism for Inter-governmental Relations*. Institute of Social Sciences. New Delhi, India.

- Suberu, R. T. (1990). Federalism and instability in Nigeria. *Plural Societies*, 19(2&3), 145- 161.
- Suberu, R. T. (1998). States creation and political economy of Nigerian federalism. Kunle Amuwo *et. al.* (eds), *Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria*. Spectrum Books Limited and IFRA, Ibadan.
- Sunday Tribune (1992). August, 26, Ibadan.
- Sunday Tribune (1992). March 5, Ibadan.
- Taiwo, V., Igwe, O., Ngutuswen, F., & Aliyu, M. (2024). Towards the rebirth of Nigeria: Imperative for Restructuring. *Sunday Tribune*, 14 March, Ibadan.
- Tell Magazine (1996). November 11, Lagos, p. 10.
- The Nation (2007). January 2. pp. 1 & 2, Lagos.
- The Nation (2007). January, 2. Lagos, pp. 1&2.
- The Nation (2013). February, 26, p.19, Lagos.
- The Nation (2018). January, 26, Lagos pp. 2 & 3.
- The Nation (2025). March, 30, Lagos.
- The Punch (2024). *Editorial Comment*, July 16, Lagos.
- The Punch (2018). Lagos, January 19
- Third Eye on Sunday (1995). May 13, Ibadan, p. 8
- Weldon, T. O. (1953). *The vocabulary of politics*. Harmondsworth, Penguin.
- West Africa (1985). *London*. August 5, pp. 18 – 22.
- Wheare, K. C. (1963). *Federal Government*, (4th Ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Williams, G. (1980). *State and society in Nigeria*. Idanre, Afrografika.
- Yoruba Peoples' of Nigeria. MEMORANDA for Yoruba Nation Independence (Undated).